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Impacts of Demographic 
Trends on US Household 
Size and Structure 
LEIWEN JIANG 
BRIAN C. O'NEILL 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE and composition have changed greatly since the founding of 
the United States, a result of a continuous process of household fission and 
decline in the importance of the family (Kobrin 1976; Ermisch and Overton 
1985). Progression through the traditional family life cycle has become less 
common as people remain unmarried for longer, cohabitation and union dis-
solution have become easier and more acceptable, and the remarriage rate 
has declined. These social adjustments are reflected in large changes in de-
mographic measures of household characteristics. The average household size 
has more than halved since 1790, dropping from 5.8 persons per household 
to 2.62 in 2000 (US Census Bureau 2005). The proportion of single-person 
households increased from 3. 7 percent in 1790 to 13 percent in 1960 and to 
26 percent in 2000. And nonfamily households consisting of people who live 
alone or share housing with nonrelatives are on the rise. 
While the change in household composition has been continuous, it 
accelerated after 1960. In 1960, 85 percent of households were family house-
holds; this figure dropped to 69 percent by 2000. Two-parent family house-
holds with children declined from 44 percent to 24 percent of all households 
between 1960 and 2000. Over the same period, unmarried-couple households 
increased from less than 1 percent to about 5 percent of total households and 
became progressively more likely to include children. The number of single-
parent (primarily single-mother) households increased from 1.5 million in 
1950 to 9.5 million in 2000 (Bianchi and Casper 2000). 
Most of these changes in household formation and dissolution occurred 
during the first half of the period since 1960, before the early 1980s. Trends 
since the 1 980s suggest a slowing or even in some cases a cessation of changes 
in household living arrangements: very little change in the proportion of 
two-parent or single-mother households, stabilized living arrangements for 
young adults and the elderly, a slowing growth in cohabitation, a decline in 
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divorce, and an almost unchanged average household size during the 1990s. It 
is unclear whether this recent stability indicates a new sustained equilibrium 
or is just a temporary lull (Bianchi and Casper 2000). 
In this article we develop a set of projections of future living arrange-
ments to explore this question. Anticipating changes in the number, size, and 
composition of households is important for many issues of social concern. 
For example, the living arrangements of the elderly are a key determinant 
of their needs for socioeconomic, physical, and emotional assistance. Older 
persons who live alone are more likely to be poor than older persons who live 
with their spouses (Dalaker 1999), and they have greater needs for health-
care. Projections of household growth and its composition by size are also 
crucial inputs to the development of housing policy for many state and local 
governments (Holmberg 1987; King 1999; Muller et al. 1999). In addition, 
much research stresses the importance of household characteristics, especially 
those linked to household life cycle stages, for understanding savings and 
consumption patterns. These patterns not only have implications for welfare 
at the household level, but may also have substantial macro-economic effects 
(Deaton and Paxson 2000; Tsai et al. 2000; Gokhale et al. 1 996). Household 
type and size also strongly affect the mix of consumption across different types 
of goods (Wilkes 1995). 
Furthermore, shifts in the distribution of households by type and size, 
through their effects on consumption patterns, have environmental conse-
quences (O'Neill et al. 2001 ). Recent work links changing living arrangements 
to effects on biodiversity (Liu et al. 2003), land use (Perz 2001; MacCracken 
et al. 1999; Van Diepen 1995), carbon dioxide emissions (Dalton et al. 2006 ), 
household energy use (O'Neill and Chen 2002; Jiang 1999; MacKellar et al. 
1995), transportation (Prskawetz et al. 2004; Carlsson-Kanyama and Linden 
1999; Select Committee on Environment 1998), and water use (Jiang 1999; 
Martin 1999). This emerging line of work moves beyond the traditional ap-
proach of treating population size as the only relevant demographic variable 
when considering environmental impacts. 
A number of studies, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, investigated 
the demographic determinants of past household changes in the United States 
(Burch 1970; Burch and Matthews 1987; Carliner 1975; Errnisch and Overton 
1985; Kobrin 1973, 1976; Richards, White, and Tsui 1987; Santi 1987, 1988; 
Sweet 1984; Teachman 1982; Watkins, Menken, and Bongaarts 1987; White 
and Tsui 1986 ). While each is informative, most focus only on the determi-
nants of a certain household type (e.g. family households, single-mother 
households, or elderly households), or on the influence of one demographic 
phenomenon (e.g., mortality or fertility). Conclusions have not always been 
clear since demographic factors can have multiple effects on household 
types. For example, the effect of immigration is complicated by a variety of 
patterns of residence upon arrival in the United States (Hunton 1998) and 
by changes after arrival as economic and social situations change (Burr and 
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Mutchler 1993). The effects of fertility and mortality on household size have 
been shown to vary over time as underlying demographic conditions change 
(Kobrin 1976). In some cases studies have even been contradictory. For ex-
ample, Burch ( 1970) concluded that under all family systems (nuclear, stem, 
and extended), life expectancy is positively correlated with average household 
size. On the other hand, Kobrin ( 197 6) maintained that mortality decline 
increases the proportions of one- and two-person households and therefore 
contributes to a fall in household size. 
Although a number of household simulation models have been devel-
oped over the past three decades, we are not aware of any systematic study of 
the influence of demographic factors on household changes. Several studies 
have reviewed changes in household headship and its determinants in the 
United States, but they either related those changes to general socioeconomic 
(rather than demographic) conditions (Carliner 1975) or decomposed the 
separate influences of changing population structure and propensities of 
household formation (Carliner 1975; Kobrin 1973 ). Such studies cannot 
identify how specific demographic factors lead to particular changes in house-
hold composition. A recent effort by Zeng et al. (2006), using the extended 
household projection model ProFamy, developed three scenarios of future 
household change for the United States. Assumptions about future fertility, 
mortality, and migration were adopted from the US Census Bureau's 2000 
population projection, and, in the absence of available scenarios for rates of 
union formation/dissolution, arbitrary assumptions were used. 
In this study we use ProFamy to construct a set of scenarios for the 
United States intended to span a wide but plausible range of outcomes for 
population composition by household age structure and size and to inves-
tigate the sensitivity of outcomes to assumptions about trends in various 
demographic events. This task requires scenarios for familiar components of 
change in a population projection (fertility, mortality, and migration) and 
for factors affecting household formation and dissolution such as divorce, 
cohabitation, age at leaving home and age at marriage, and propensity of the 
elderly to live with children. Here the literature is sparse and we break new 
ground in justifying our scenarios on the basis of past trends and theoretical 
reasoning. 
Data and methodology 
We adopt the macro-dynamic household projection model ProFamy devel-
oped by Zeng and his collaborators (Zeng, Vaupel, and Wang 1997, 1998). 
Zeng extended Bongaarts's nuclear status life table model (Bongaarts 1987) 
into a general family household simulation macro model that includes both 
nuclear and three-generation family households (Zeng 1986, 1988, 1991). That 
model was further extended and developed into a two-sex dynamic model, 
known as ProFamy, that permits demographic schedules to change over time 
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and requires only conventional data sources such as survey data, vital statis-
tics, and census data (Zeng, Vaupel, and Wang 1997, 1998). Projections are 
performed based on status transition rates, and distributions of households by 
size and type are then derived based on characteristics of reference persons 
(or household "markers") in a manner that produces consistent projections of 
households and individuals. Individuals in the projected population are clas-
sified according to eight dimensions of demographic status: age, sex, marital 
status, parity, number of children living at home, co-residence with parents, 
private or collective household, and race. ProFamy has been used to make 
population and household projections for China (Zeng, Wang, Jiang, and Gu, 
forthcoming) and two regions of China (Jiang 1999), Austria (Prskawetz, Ji-
ang, and O'Neill 2004), Germany (Hullen 2003), and the United States (Zeng 
et al. 2006). 
Projections require data on base-year population and household type 
and estimates of current summary measures and standard schedules, which 
we adopt from Zeng et al. (2006). We develop our own scenarios of future 
summary measures of fertility, mortality, union formation and dissolution, 
migration, leaving the parental home, and mean ages of leaving the parental 
home, marriage, and giving birth. The model distinguishes four races (white 
non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and others), although in this 
study we assume that summary measures change by the same proportion 
across all race categories. 
Plausible future demographic trends 
Future living arrangements will be influenced by numerous demographic 
variables, but not all such variables are equally important to all outcomes. 
Here we focus on particular outcomes of interest--changes in population 
composition by household size and age of the householder (referred to as 
"householder age")-although we also examine results for selected additional 
household types. Note that the composition of the population by householder 
age (i.e., the percent of the population living in households headed by a 
householder of a particular age) is different from the population age struc-
ture, since composition by householder age reflects not only population age 
structure but also the age composition of households. 
We select demographic variables that will be the most important deter-
minants of these outcomes based on two sources of information: previous 
studies (discussed earlier) and an initial sensitivity analysis carried out with 
ProFamy that varies all input variables by ± 25 percent (Jiang and O'Neill 
2006; results not reported here). These considerations lead us to eliminate 
from consideration possible future changes in the proportion of elderly living 
with an adult child, the propensity of leaving the parental home, and the age 
at marriage or at giving birth. Changes in these variables had only a weak ef-
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feet on the household size and age composition of the US population (Jiang 
and O'Neill 2006) .1 
We focus instead on fertility, mortality, migration, and rates of union 
formation and dissolution. The direction of the effect of most of these vari-
ables is relatively clear. A decline in fertility will lead to a reduction in house-
hold size and aging of the population as the proportion of children decreases 
(with opposite effects for an increase in fertility). An increase in union forma-
tion rates will lead to larger households by more frequently combining two 
household units into one, but will likely have minor effects on household 
age structure. Secondarily, household size will increase further because of the 
higher fertility rate of those in unions, especially marriage. Union dissolution 
will have the opposite effects, leading to smaller households. 
The effects of changes in life expectancy and migration on aging are well 
known, but their effects on household size are less clear, as noted earlier. And 
even for variables in which the direction of an effect can be anticipated, the 
relative magnitudes of effects are not obvious, nor are the detailed impacts on 
households of particular sizes (as opposed to average household size). 
Below, we discuss each of the variables in tum, presenting our high, me-
dium, and low scenarios for subsequent use in the household projections. 
Fertility, life expectancy, and net migration 
Several institutions routinely develop long-term scenarios for the total fertility 
rate (TFR), life expectancy, and net migration, and we therefore base our own 
range of assumptions on this existing work. We group projections by the US 
Census Bureau (Hollmann et al. 2000; US Census Bureau 2004), the United 
Nations (UNPD 2004, 2005), the World Bank (2004), IIASA (Lutz et al. 2001 ), 
and the US Social Security Advisory Board (2003) into high, medium, and low 
scenarios as self-described by the institutions themselves. We then take the 
average of the published projections by each group to obtain our three sce-
narios. We use this averaging procedure since it is conservative (as compared 
to selecting the most extreme projections available), representative of the 
literature in a way that does not favor any particular institution's projection, 
and has some theoretical and empirical support (Sanderson 1998). Table 1 
summarizes results for the year 2100. In general, changes in TFR mainly oc-
TABLE 1 Summary of assumptions for demographic rates, United 
States, 2000 and 2100 
2100 
2000 Low Medium 
Total fertility rate 2.05 1.5 2.0 
Life expectancy (years) 76.9 83 91 
Net immigration (millions) 1.05 0.7 1.3 
High 
2.5 
103 
2.7 
572 US H O U SE HOLD SIZE AND STRU CTU RE 
cur in the first 25 years, while life expectancy increases occur approximately 
linearly for the whole projection period. Net migration diverges across sce-
narios most rapidly over the first 30 years, then remains roughly constant in 
the medium and low scenarios while continuing to rise in the high scenario. 
After 2030, net migration increase/decrease occurs almost linearly for all three 
scenarios (for detail see Appendix Table 2 and Jiang and O'Neill 2006). 
Union formation 
The past two decades have witnessed a surge in research on marriage and 
cohabitation in the United States. However, we are not aware of any reasoned 
projections of these trends into the future. Furthermore, quantitative studies 
tend to use crude rates as the measure of union formation and dissolution, 
which do not reflect changes in the population at risk. Because we use general 
rates (the ratio of demographic events to the total number of person-years 
at risk) in our projection, studies of trends in crude rates are not directly ap-
plicable. Here, we develop a range of scenarios we consider plausible based 
on historical trends and analogy to experience in European countries. Union 
formation consists of both marriage and cohabitation, while union dissolution 
consists of both divorce and cohabitation dissolution. It is difficult to consider 
trends in each of these rates individually, since they are closely linked to one 
another. We therefore first briefly review the literature and historical trends 
for the United States and other (primarily European) countries for all these 
rates, and then specify the assumptions for our scenarios. 
Over the past 50-100 years US general marriage rates have been gener-
ally high compared to those of many European countries and have shared 
with the latter a substantial marriage boom after World War II. Following this 
boom, general marriage rates declined; in the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Sweden these rates have stabilized or increased slightly since the 1980s, while 
in the United States they have continued to decline. Still, the general rate 
in the United States in 2000 was about 6.7 percent, whereas in these Nordic 
countries it was at or below 5 percent. This comparison suggests that the US 
rate could plausibly continue to decline. At the same time, an increase in the 
United States is also plausible. A study forecasting the experience of cohorts 
born in the 1950s and 1960s concludes that marriage in the United States will 
remain nearly universal for American women: close to 90 percent of women 
are predicted to marry (Goldstein and Kenney 2001 ). Moreover, forecasts that 
distinguish among educational groups indicate that while in the past women 
with more education were less likely to marry, recent college graduates will 
have the highest rate compared to women with lower levels of educational 
attainment of eventually marrying despite their later entry into marriage. 
This implies that general marriage rates may increase in the future when the 
effect of postponing marriage for education vanishes. 
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The past decline in the general marriage rate has been partially offset 
by a rise in nonmarital cohabitation. Recent studies have improved the 
measurement of cohabitation and indicate a larger increase than previously 
thought (Baughman, Dickert-Conlin, and Houser 2002; Casper and Cohen 
2000). According to an analysis of the 1987-88 National Survey of Families 
and Households and the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, the general 
cohabitation rate among women aged 15-29 increased from 2.1 percent in 
the early 1970s to 7.3 percent in the early 1990s and 12.3 percent in 2000, 
while the general marriage rate declined (Raley 2001 ). In 1995, the propor-
tion of females who had entered cohabitation by age 25 reached about 45 
percent. Continued increase appears plausible, since this measure has been 
rising with no obvious peak across a wide range of countries (UNPD 2003). 
Some Scandinavian and western European countries have substantially larger 
percentages of women entering cohabitation by age 2 5 as compared to the 
United States, for example 75 percent in Sweden, 60 percent in France, and 
58 percent in Norway and Austria. 
Examination of the historical relationship between general marriage 
rates and cohabitation rates indicates that the increase in the latter in the 
l 960s-l 980s in the United States has been almost as great as the decline in 
the former-with the result that the total union formation rate has been rela-
tively stable (Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991; 
Manning 1993, 1995). A number of more recent studies show that cohabita-
tion continues largely to offset the decline in marriage, with a slight decrease 
in the total union formation rate (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Casper and Bianchi 
2002; Heuveline and Timeberlake 2004; Toulemon 1997). For example, while 
the proportion married by age 25 declined from 71 to 52 percent between 
1977 and 1992, there was much less change over these cohorts (from 7 8 to 70 
percent) in the proportion of women who had lived in a union. This means 
that more than 60 percent of the reduction in union formation due to the 
declining marriage rate was offset by an increasing cohabitation rate. 
Whether these trends will continue to offset each other in the future is 
unclear. The compensating effect of cohabitation has been weakening over 
time. More broadly, there has been considerable debate over the relationship 
between cohabitation and marriage (Bianchi and Casper 2000; Brown and 
Booth 1996; Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991; Clarkberg, Stolzenberg, and 
Waite 1995; Manning 1993, 1995; Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel 1990; Thorn-
ton 1989). Some argue that cohabitation is typically a prelude to marriage, 
while others maintain that cohabitation is an alternative to or substitute for 
marriage. In Scandinavia and some western European countries, cohabita-
tion has become more a substitution given that an increasing number of co-
habiters remain in consensual unions without marrying. In contrast, studies 
of the marital status transition in the United States indicate that cohabiting 
unmarried couples have a much higher propensity for marriage than do non-
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cohabiting unmarried persons. In a 1987-88 survey, 46 percent of cohabiters 
characterized their living arrangement as a precursor to marriage, while an-
other 15 percent classified the arrangement as a trial marriage and 10 percent 
as a substitute for marriage. About 40 percent of all unmarried couples in 
this survey were married within five to seven years. More than 50 percent of 
couples who characterized their living arrangement as a precursor married 
within five to seven years, compared to 25 percent of unmarried couples in a 
"trial marriage" or "substitute marriage" (Casper and Sayer 2000). 
Union dissolution 
The general divorce rate was considerably higher in the United States than 
in many western European countries in the past century (Ahlburg and De 
Vita 1992). However, while it has continuously increased in western Europe, 
the divorce rate in the United States declined after 1980 and is currently 
not much different from the European rates. The general divorce rate in the 
United States dropped from 3.6 percent in 1980 to 3.1 percent in 2000, while 
it increased from 2.2 percent to 3.3 percent in Sweden, and from 2.0 percent 
to 2.8 percent in Denmark during the same period. The decrease of divorce in 
the United States appears to be real even considering the effect of increasing 
cohabitation and taking into account other compositional factors (Goldstein 
1999). Therefore, it is possible that divorce will continue to decrease, with 
recent trends signaling a fundamental change in marriage patterns. On the 
other hand, given trends in Europe, particularly in Sweden where the divorce 
rate is higher than in the United States, it is not implausible that the US gen-
eral divorce rate could increase in the future. 
Our calculations indicate that the general cohabitation dissolution rate 
over ten years is currently 38 percent in the United States, significantly higher 
than the general divorce rate (Jiang and O'Neill 2006) . Comparison to past 
trends for cohorts in low-fertility countries shows that the general cohabita-
tion dissolution rate has become stable in eastern European countries and 
some other parts of Europe, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy, 
at levels that are both higher and lower than the US rate. 
The joint effect of divorce and cohabitation dissolution represents a sub-
stantial increase in the instability of unions in the United States (increasing 
from 30 percent to 38 percent dissolution over ten years) despite the decrease 
in the US divorce rate of the last two decades. This decreasing stability results 
from a decline in the proportion of cohabiters who marry their cohabiting 
partner (from 60 to 53 percent over this period). Similarly, unions begun by 
cohabitation have become less stable: the proportion of couples separating 
within five years of cohabiting (including those who marry after cohabiting) 
increased from 45 percent to 54 percent (Bumpass and Lu 2000) . Data from 
Sweden (Bennett, Blanc, and Bloom 1988) and Canada (Balakrishnan et al. 
LEIWEN JIANG I BRIAN C. O'NEILL 575 
1987) also suggest that marriages following cohabitation are more, rather 
than less, likely to end in divorce. 
Plausible future changes in union formation 
and dissolution 
The historical experience in the United States is one of more common and 
more stable unions-higher marriage rates and lower divorce rates-than 
currently exist. At the same time, European countries provide many examples 
of substantially less stable unions-lower marriage rates and higher cohabita-
tion rates-than currently observed in the United States. And finally, based 
on international experience, a range of possible relationships exists between 
marriage and cohabitation, including cohabitation as either a precursor to 
marriage (in which case changes in marriage and cohabitation rates would 
move in the same direction) or a substitute for marriage (in which case mar-
riage and cohabitation rates would be more independent, or even inversely 
correlated). 
We incorporate in our scenarios a wide range of future possibilities by 
defining one set of assumptions that, taken together, lead to unions that are 
common and stable, and another set that leads to unions that are less com-
mon and unstable (see Table 2). Specifically, in the common and stable union 
case, we assume that by 2050 the general marriage rate will double (from 6.7 
percent in 2000)-retuming to its highest historical value, which occurred 
around 1950. We assume that the general cohabitation rate increases by 50 
percent (rising from 12.3 percent in 2000 to 18.5 percent in 2050) or about 
the 2000 level in Sweden. Cohabitation in this scenario therefore serves more 
as a precursor to marriage than a substitute for it. We assume that the general 
divorce rate will decrease from 3.2 percent in 2000 to 1.5 percent in 2050, 
about the level in 1950, but we do not assume a decline in the cohabitation 
dissolution rate. Cohabitation dissolution includes the transition to marriage, 
and therefore constant cohabitation dissolution seems more consistent with 
TABLE 2 Summary of assumptions for union formation and dissolution 
rates, 2000 to 2050 
Common/stable Medium Less common/unstable 
Marriage double to 1950 level constantb -55% to level of Sweden• 
Cohabitation +50% to level of Sweden• constant constant 
Divorce -50% to 1950 level constant +25% to 1980 level 
Cohabitation dissolution constant constant +25% to level of Sweden• 
Definition of rates: Marriage: the proportion of newly married persons to the total number of unmarried persons in the 
previous year; Cohabitation: the number of new cohabitants divided by the number of non-cohabiting never-married, 
widowed, and divorced persons in the previous year; Divorce: the number of divorces divided by the number of married 
couples in the previous year; Cohabitation dissolution: the number of dissolved cohabitations divided by the total number 
of cohabitation units in the previous years.• Sweden in 2000. •constant at level of 2000. 
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the assumptions of high rates of marriage and cohabitation. After 2050, all 
the union formation and dissolution rates are assumed to be constant. 
For the case of less common and unstable unions, we assume that the 
general marriage rate will drop from 6. 7 percent in 2000 to 3 percent in 
2050, about the 2000 level in Sweden. In this case cohabitation acts more as 
a substitute for marriage; therefore to be conservative we assume that the 
general cohabitation rate remains constant, rather than declining along with 
the marriage rate. We assume that the general divorce rate increases from 
3.2 percent in 2000 to 4 percent in 2050, close to its highest level in 1980, 
while the general cohabitation dissolution rate increases from 38 percent in 
2000 to 48 percent, close to the 2000 Swedish level. After 2050, all the rates 
are assumed to be constant. 
Household projections for the United States 
We group our assumptions about TFR, life expectancy, migration, and union 
formation and dissolution into three alternative scenarios intended to span 
a wide range of plausible outcomes in composition by household age and 
household size. One end of this range is defined by a "large and young" sce-
nario, in which we combine high TFR, modest rise in life expectancy, and 
high net immigration with the assumption of common and stable unions: 
high general union formation rates and low general union dissolution rates, 
as detailed in the previous section. This combination of assumptions is inter-
nally consistent given that fertility is higher within unions and among recent 
immigrants. This correlation among high fertility, common and stable unions, 
and high net immigration also implies that this combination of input assump-
tions is more likely than it would be if trends in each of these variables were 
completely independent. 
The other end of the range is defined by a "small and old" scenario, in 
which we combine low TFR, substantial rise in life expectancy, and low net 
immigration with less common and unstable unions (i.e., low general union 
formation rates and high general union dissolution rates). In the medium 
scenario, all assumptions take moderate values as defined in Tables 1 and 2 
(detailed values for assumptions in all three scenarios are included in Ap-
pendix Tables 2a-2c). 
We first conduct a household projection based on the medium scenario. 
Results for average household size (Figure 1) show that average size is ex-
pected to decline for 20-30 years before beginning to rise and returning to 
the 2000 level. This occurs despite the fact that there is little change in demo-
graphic rates: by the year 2100 TFR increases by only 1 percent, annual net 
immigration by 19 percent, and life expectancy by 18 percent, while union 
formation and dissolution rates and all other demographic variables remain 
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FIGURE 1 Historical and projected population, households, and 
household size, United States, 1950-2000 
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at the 2000 level. A projection with all inputs held constant produces much 
the same result. 
A decomposition analysis2 shows that 60 percent of the decrease in av-
erage household size in the period 2000-2030 is due to shifts in population 
age structure while 40 percent is due to changes in household headship rates 
that occur even in the absence of changes in demographic rates. Headship 
rates change as a result of the momentum of the demographic events affecting 
household formation and dissolution (Zeng et al. 2006). Baby boomers ex-
perienced marked changes in demographic behavior from the 1960s to early 
1980s: a low level of and postponed marriage, a rapid increase in the divorce 
rate, low fertility and late childbearing, and an early and high propensity of 
leaving the parental home. The effect of these changes on household size and 
structure persists as households pass through the life cycle, even after demo-
graphic rates stabilize. The number and average size of households display 
the longer-term and lag effects of period demographic changes. It may be 
particularly important to capture these changes in order to produce accurate 
forecasts over the next few decades. 
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Next we compare results across all three scenarios. US population size 
and number of households continues to grow in all cases (Figure 1 ). Popula-
tion grows from 280 million at the start of the century to 390-980 million by 
2100-a factor of 2.6 uncertainty range. The number of households grows 
from 100 million to 190-310 million, a substantially smaller uncertainty 
range. In fact, through 2050 there is little uncertainty in the number of 
households. However, our results do not reflect the full range of uncertainty 
because the scenarios were designed to span a wide range of population size 
and age composition, a decision that has the effect of narrowing the range of 
uncertainty concerning the numbers of households. 
Average household size changes from 2.6 at the beginning of the century 
to 2.0-3.l by 2100 (with most of the change occurring by 2050). In all sce-
narios average household size decreases over at least the first several decades, 
mainly owing to the changes in population age structure and household 
headship rates. 
Our projections also provide more disaggregated results for particular 
household types, which are not available from a simple headship rate projec-
tion. 3 Results indicate, for example, that changes in average household size 
FIGURE 2 Projected proportion of population of households by 
household size, United States, 2000-2100 
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are driven primarily by a tradeoff between the proportions living in house-
holds of size 4+ and those living in households of size 1 and 2. There is little 
change in the proportion living in households of size 3 (Figure 2). Under 
the "small/old" scenario, the proportion of the population living in I-person 
households almost doubles by 2100, and the proportion in 2-person house-
holds increases by 40 percent by 2040. At the same time, the proportion living 
in 4+-person households decreases by about 33 percent. Conversely, under 
the "large/young" scenario, the proportions of the population living in 1- and 
2-person households decrease by about 50 percent and 15 percent, respec-
tively, while the share in 4+-person households increases by 33 percent. 
We also analyze changes in the proportion of the population living in 
households headed by different age groups (Figure 3) . In all scenarios there 
is little change in the proportion living in households headed by the middle -
aged (those between ages 45 and 65), while elderly households (ages 65 and 
older) gain, and young households (under age 45) decline, as a share of the 
population. This shift occurs to roughly equal degrees across scenarios over 
the first 30 years (due to population momentum), with the proportion liv-
ing in elderly households doubling from 11 percent to 20 percent or more. 
FIGURE 3 Projected proportion of the population living in 
households by age of the head, United States, 2000-2100 
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Thereafter, this proportion continues to rise to nearly 40 percent by 2100 in 
the "small/old" scenario, while it remains essentially constant in the "large/ 
young" scenario. 
These results differ from those pertaining to the age structure of the 
population at large (projections not shown). For example, the population 
aged 45-64 accounts for 18-20 percent of the total population in these sce-
narios by 2100, while the proportion of the population living in households 
headed by persons aged 45-64 ranges from 25 to 28 percent. Results are also 
significantly different for the under 45 category (29-39 percent of the total 
population, and 35-52 percent for the population by householder age), while 
differences are smaller for the 65+ category ( 17-37 percent of the total popu-
lation, and 20-39 percent for population by householder age), which is much 
less affected by the possible presence of children in the household. 
Sensitivity analysis of impacts of demographic 
trends on household composition 
The future changes in population composition by household type discussed 
in the previous section are determined by the joint effects of various demo-
graphic rates. To assess the relative importance of changes in individual de-
mographic variables, we conduct a sensitivity analysis in which we keep all 
variables constant except one, testing in tum the effect of each of the variables 
in Tables 1 and 2. Results show that the parameter with the strongest effect on 
average household size is TFR: increasing (or decreasing) TFR from about 2.0 
in 2000 to 2.5 (or 1.5) in 2100 increases (or decreases) the average household 
size relative to the benchmark case by about 8 percent by 2100 (Figures 4 and 
5). The general marriage rate is the second most influential variable. Doubling 
the general marriage rate by 2050 causes average household size to increase 
by 5 percent by 2100, while reducing it by roughly half leads to a 10 percent 
reduction in household size by 2100. Changes in the general cohabitation rate 
also affect household size, but much more weakly than changes in the general 
marriage rate. The reason is that while increases in the two rates generate 
similar changes in the proportion of couple households, an increased mar-
riage rate leads to a higher proportion of couple households with children, 
since married couples have higher fertility than cohabiting couples. In fact, 
a decrease in the general divorce rate induces a slightly greater impact on 
household size than does an increase in the cohabitation rate. 
Other demographic trends-changes in net immigration, life expectancy, 
and the general cohabitation rate-have only a weak impact on household 
size. In particular, the effect of life expectancy in the high mortality scenario 
(the one that assumes a relatively modest increase in life expectancy by 
2100) is not much different from that in the medium scenario. However, 
the direction of the (small) effect is noteworthy: an increase in life expec-
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FIGURE 4 Sensitivity analysis: Impacts of demographic events on projected 
average household size, United States, 2000-2100 
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tancy produces a smaller average household size. Increasing life expectancy 
increases the size of elderly households as more spouses live longer, but also 
increases the proportion of the population living in households headed by 
the elderly, a category whose household size is still small relative to the rest 
of the population. 
Results for composition by householder age (Figure 6) are more straight-
forward. Variables that have a strong effect on population age structure-fer-
tility and life expectancy-also have a substantial effect on composition by 
householder age. Variables such as cohabitation, divorce, and cohabitation 
dissolution do not substantially affect householder age structure. Changes in 
the general marriage rate do have some effect on composition by householder 
age, even though the changes do not affect population age structure. Since 
fertility is higher within marriage and is shifted to older ages, an increase in 
the marriage rate while holding TFR constant leads to a shift in population to 
somewhat older households. It is also noteworthy that reducing the number 
of net immigrants will significantly increase the proportion of elderly house-
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FIGURE 5 Sensitivity analysis: Percentage differences in average household 
size resulting from stipulated changes in demographic events relative to the 
medium scenario in 2100, United States 
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holds and decrease the proportion of young and middle-age households. In 
comparison, the impact of increasing the number of net immigrants is ap-
parently smaller. 
We also examine the effect of these demographic rates on household 
types of particular significance: one-person, couple-only, couple with chil-
dren, single parent with children, and three-generation households (Appen-
dix Table 1). In the medium scenario, one-person and couple-only households 
increase as a proportion of the population up to the middle of the century, 
then decrease to their original levels, while households consisting of couples 
with children change in the opposite manner: a decrease followed by a re-
turn to original levels. These effects are due to population and household 
momentum, as discussed above. The proportion of the population living in 
households containing single parents with children increases throughout the 
century in the medium scenario, while the proportion in three-generation 
households falls and remains well below original levels. 
The shares of one-person and couple-only households are most sensitive 
to marriage and cohabitation. Increase in union formation rates leads to a 
sharp decrease in the population living in single-person households and an in-
crease in couple-only households, relative to the constant scenario. Similarly, 
increasing the TFR leads to a substantial decrease in couple-only households 
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FIGURE 6 Projected differences in the proportions of population 
living in the households by age of the head in 2100 relative to the 
constant scenario (constant=!) 
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and a marked increase in households consisting of couples with children, 
relative to the medium scenario. Marriage rates are even more important to 
the changes of couple-with-children households: a declining general mar-
riage rate induces the biggest reduction in couple-with-children households. 
Single-parent households (with or without children) are most affected either 
by fertility (increasing fertility leads to increases in the proportion living in 
these households) or by union formation/dissolution (more stable unions 
lead to a decrease in this household type) . Three-generation households are 
also most sensitive to the changes in TFR and marriage rates. 
Conclusions 
We used the dynamic household projection model ProFamy to assess the 
sensitivity of future living arrangements in the United States to various de-
mographic factors and to develop a range of scenarios for composition of the 
population by household age structure and size. These scenarios are based on 
new scenarios for fertility, life expectancy, and migration derived by averaging 
across existing scenarios in the literature, an approach that has been suggested 
(Sanderson 1998) but not previously been used in long-term projections. We 
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also produced the first long-term scenarios for household formation and dis-
solution rates that are grounded in past trends, experience in other countries, 
and current theoretical perspectives. We anticipate that marriage rates could 
plausibly double, or decline by half; cohabitation rates could double; and 
divorce rates could increase by 25 percent or decline by half. 
Our results indicate that average household size declines over the next 
few decades in all scenarios, mainly owing to changes in population age struc-
ture and secondarily to momentum in household formation and dissolution. 
By the second half of the century, the range of plausible average household 
size outcomes is 2 .0 to 3 .1, with this result being driven by tradeoffs in the 
proportion of the population living in one- and two-person households, 
on the one hand, and households of size 4+, on the other. Our sensitivity 
analysis demonstrates that the most important determinants of household 
size composition of the population are fertility and rates of union formation 
and dissolution. The proportion living in households headed by the elderly 
(65+) doubles in the "large/young" scenario, and nearly quadruples in the 
"small/old" scenario, to 40 percent of the population. Conversely, the propor-
tion living in households headed by the young (<45) declines substantially, 
from 60 percent to 35 percent. 
Taken together, these results propose a range of plausible outcomes for 
living arrangements over the next 50-100 years. We have been conservative 
in defining our scenarios, by not choosing the most extreme assumptions in 
the literature for the components of population change and by grounding our 
scenarios for union formation and dissolution rates in past experience in the 
United States and other countries. It is possible that unprecedented rates of 
demographic events could be experienced in the future, in which case this 
range of demographic outcomes would be expanded even further. 
APPENDIX TABLE I Sensitivity of the projected population composition by 
household type to demographic events (percent of total population), United States, 
2000-2100 
One Couple Couple Single parent Three 
person only with child with child generation 
Medium 
2000 25.8 26.8 31.7 8.5 3.5 
2030 28.6 28.8 26.4 10.2 l.2 
2050 28.4 27.3 27.0 10.9 1.4 
2100 24.4 26.9 30.0 l l.6 l.8 
TFR+ 
2030 -0.8 -2.5 2.3 0 .9 0.2 
2050 -l.5 -3.9 3.9 l.5 0.3 
2100 -2.4 -5.2 5.5 2.3 0.5 
TFR-
2030 0.9 3.5 -3 .3 -l.O -0.2 
2050 l.7 5.1 -5.4 -l.3 -0.5 
2100 2.8 5.4 -7 .2 -l.O -0.5 
Mar+ 
2030 -3.3 4.1 7.7 -l.5 -0.3 
2050 -5.9 7.5 2 .2 -2.2 -0.6 
2100 -6.7 9.1 2.5 -2.5 -0.9 
Mar-
2030 2.1 -2.4 -l.4 1.3 0.2 
2050 5.0 -5.4 -4.3 3.5 0.3 
2100 11.l -10.6 -10.4 7.4 0.4 
LE+ 
2030 -0.6 1.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 
2050 -0.8 2.1 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 
2100 -l.7 3.8 -0.6 -1.l 0.1 
LE-
2030 0 .0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2050 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2100 0 .0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
NM+ 
2030 -0.3 -0.5 0.6 0.3 0.1 
2050 -0.7 -0.9 1.1 0.4 0.1 
2100 -0.7 -1.l l.2 0.5 0.1 
NM-
2030 -1.l 2.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 
2050 -0.6 l.9 -l.O -0.2 0.0 
2100 0.0 l.2 -l.O -0.l 0.1 
Dvc+ 
2030 0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.0 
2050 0.8 -0.6 -0.9 0.5 0.0 
2100 1.1 -0.7 -l.2 0.7 0.0 
Dvc-
2030 --0.9 0.7 l.O -0.6 0.0 
2050 -l.8 l.3 2.0 -1.2 0.0 
2100 -2.6 l.9 3.0 -l.6 0.0 
Coh+ 
2030 -l.6 l.6 l.O -0.6 0.0 
2050 -2.9 3.0 l.7 -1.2 -0.1 
2100 -3.5 4.3 l.9 -l.6 -0.2 
CHD+ 
2030 0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.0 
2050 l.O -l.O -0.6 0.4 0.0 
2100 1.3 -1.4 -0.7 0.6 0.0 
NOTES: See Notes to Figure 4. Households with other relatives or with nonrelatives are not 
included. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2a Medium scenarios for US household projection 
TFR LE NM Mar Coh Dvc CHD 
2000 2 .03 76 .8 lll0218 0.07 0 .12 0.03 0.38 
2005 2.03 78.0 1079723 0.07 0.12 0.03 0 .38 
2010 2 .02 78.8 1015892 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2015 2 .00 79.6 1041495 0.07 0 .12 0.03 0.38 
2020 2.00 80.4 1065476 0.07 0 .12 0.03 0.38 
2025 1.99 81.2 1161428 0 .07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2030 1.99 81.9 1249481 0 .07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2035 1.99 82.6 1248439 0.07 0 .12 0.03 0 .38 
2040 1.99 83.2 1251699 0.07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2045 1.99 83.9 1257617 0 .07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2050 1.99 84.5 1265059 0 .07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2055 1.99 85.2 1268905 0.07 0 .12 0 .03 0.38 
2060 2.00 85.9 1273475 0.07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2065 2.00 86.5 1278413 0 .07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2070 2 .00 87.3 1283659 0 .07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2075 2 .01 87.9 1289325 0 .07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2080 2.01 88.5 1295321 0.07 0 .12 0.03 0.38 
2085 2.01 89.1 1301590 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2090 2.01 89.8 1308251 0.07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2095 2.01 90.4 1315133 0 .07 0 .12 0.03 0.38 
2100 2.01 90.8 1322396 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
APPENDIX TABLE 2b Small household size and old age structure scenario 
("small/old" scenario) for US household projection 
TFR LE NM Mar Coh Dvc CHD 
2000 2.00 76.9 935069 0 .07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2005 1.83 78 .3 777587 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.39 
2010 1.75 79 .7 692334 0.06 0.12 0 .03 0.40 
2015 1.67 81.2 681905 0 .06 0.12 0 .03 0.41 
2020 1.61 82 .6 676296 0.05 0.12 0 .04 0.42 
2025 1.59 84.0 707074 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.43 
2030 1.57 85 .2 732446 0 .04 0.12 0 .04 0.44 
2035 1.57 86.4 717331 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.45 
2040 1.57 87 .7 708322 0.04 0 .12 0.04 0.46 
2045 1.57 89.1 702724 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.47 
2050 1.57 90.4 698602 0.03 0 .123 0.04 0.48 
2055 1.57 91.8 695466 0.03 0 .123 0.04 0.48 
2060 1.56 93 .0 692651 0.03 0 .123 0.04 0.48 
2065 1.56 94.6 689804 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2070 l.56 95.7 686816 0.03 0 .123 0 .04 0.48 
2075 1.56 97.4 683906 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2080 1.56 98.6 681180 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2085 1.56 100.1 678498 0 .03 0 .123 0.04 0.48 
2090 1.55 101.5 676080 0.03 0 .123 0 .04 0.48 
2095 1.55 102.5 673772 0 .03 0.123 0 .04 0.48 
2100 l.55 103.5 671704 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2c Large household size and young age structure scenario 
("large/young" scenario) for US household projection 
TFR LE NM Mar Coh Dvc CHD 
2000 2 .02 76.47 1316348 0 .07 0.12 0 .03 0.38 
2005 2 .20 76.99 1494753 0.07 0 .13 0 .03 0.38 
2010 2.28 77.54 1491751 0.08 0 .14 0.03 0 .38 
2015 2.32 78.05 1601934 0.09 0 .14 0.03 0.38 
2020 2 .35 78.64 1697708 0.10 0.15 0 .03 0.38 
2025 2.36 79.17 1936451 0.10 0.15 0.02 0 .38 
2030 2.37 79.56 2169402 0.11 0.16 0 .02 0.38 
2035 2.38 79.81 2214463 0.12 0 .17 0 .02 0.38 
2040 2.37 80.16 2258698 0 .13 0.17 0.02 0.38 
2045 2.38 80.36 2301723 0.13 0.18 0 .02 0.38 
2050 2.39 80.78 2343678 0 .14 0.18 0.02 0.38 
2055 2.40 80.98 2386430 0 .14 0.18 0.02 0.38 
2060 2.41 81.27 2428252 0.14 0 .18 0.02 0 .38 
2065 2.42 81.52 2469008 0.14 0 .18 0.02 0.38 
2070 2.42 82.01 2508931 0.14 0.18 0.02 0.38 
2075 2.43 82.15 2548442 0.14 0.18 0.02 0.38 
2080 2.44 82.27 2587483 0 .14 0.18 0.02 0 .38 
2085 2 .44 82.42 2626136 0.14 0 .18 0.02 0 .38 
2090 2 .44 82 .67 2664467 0 .14 0.18 0.02 0.38 
2095 2.44 82.68 2702588 0 .14 0.18 0.02 0 .38 
2100 2.44 82.72 2740520 0.14 0.18 0.02 0.38 
Notes 
1 The independent effect of increasing 
age at marriage is always to drive down aver-
age household size, since postponement of 
marriage means more people living in small 
non-family households for longer. However, 
the impact of changes in mean age at child-
bearing is more complicated. Our preliminary 
analysis using the ProFamy model indicates 
that increasing mean age at childbearing 
causes fluctuations in average household 
size (Jiang and O'Neill 2006). The shift in the 
period fertility schedule caused by delayed 
childbearing increases the fertility of women 
in older childbearing years, while decreasing 
the fertility of women in younger childbearing 
years. The net period effect on births depends 
on the age structure. In the United States, the 
age structure during the period 2000-2030 
structure favors fewer births and exerts a 
negative effect on average size. 
. favors increased births and therefore has a 
positive effect on household size. Later, age 
2 The analysis is available on request: 
Leiwen_Jiang@Brown.edu 
3 We compared ProFamy results to those 
from a projection in which age-specific head-
ship rates are held constant at their current 
values and combined with the ProFamy pro-
jection of population age structure. Differences 
in the projected total number of households 
are generally only a few percent, except in the 
"large/young" scenario, in which they reach 
10 percent by the end of the century (differ-
ences in average household size are slightly 
smaller). The benefit of using an approach 
more sophisticated than constant headship 
rates is therefore in the possibility of obtaining 
numbers of households by type rather than 
simply the total number of households. 
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